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1. ‘Patriotism’, exclaimed the 18th century sage Dr Johnson famously, ‘is the 
last refuge of a scoundrel’. What he meant, perhaps, is that justifying an 
action in terms of what its agent is – an Englishman, say – is no substitute for 
a rational defence of it, and may well cloak an ulterior motive. Johnson was 
essentially an Enlightenment thinker, sharing David Hume’s view that 
‘mankind are so much the same in all times and places that history informs us 
of nothing new or strange’2. But an idea of cultural nationality was already 
developing in his day, and, indeed, Johnson’s own Lives of the Poets was itself 
part of a Europe wide trend for histories of national literature. It was in 
Germany, however, that this type of trend took a decisively anti-
Enlightenment turn. Writing at about the same time as Johnson, Johann 
Gottfried von Herder notes that ‘every region of the earth has its peculiar 
species of animals’, and he asks rhetorically, ‘Why should it not have its own 
kind of men? Are not the varieties of natural features, manners and character, 
and particularly the great differences in language proof of this?’3 In the 
Herderian vision what I am can justify how I act, since we should not, in 
Enlightenment fashion, expect any universal standard for judging people’s 
actions. 
                                                            
1 This paper is largely a summary of parts of my book Cultural Identity and Political Ethics 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2010) 
2 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) sec.65 
3 Quoted R.R. Ergang Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism (New York: 
Columbia UP, 1931) pp. 90-1 







Herder held that cultures are objectively distinguishable, so that the self-
identification of members is based on a recognition of their cultural 
distinctiveness, rather than cultural distinctiveness being the result of their 
self-identifications. Furthermore, he held two further theses to account for 
the radical differences which he discerned between cultures. First, he took 
these differences to consist in part in divergences in values. Second, he 
believed that the different languages of separate cultures gave rise to different 
world views. Both these contribute to the notion that members of different 
cultures will at least have difficulty in understanding and socialising with one 
another, and consequently that this should be recognised in the political 
arrangements made for them. 
It was Herder’s vision that provided the intellectual support for the 
nationalist movements of the nineteenth century. Notoriously the problem 
for nationalists has been to provide an agreed criterion for national identity. 
Race, religion, language, common interests, geography and so on all prove 
inadequate, as Ernest Renan showed4. Rather, proponents of one national 
identity plump for one criterion because it suits their case, while proponents 
of a different identity plump for another. Yet, however it is taken to relate to 
such different criteria, national character can supposedly play an agreed role 
in individuating separate nations. Thus Herder’s idea that the people of 
separate nations have different characters proved indispensable to 
nationalists. Furthermore, it served better than the different criteria 
mentioned to justify the nationalist project of separate statehood, and for two 
reasons. First, because the same sort of laws might seem appropriate to those 
with the same sort of characters. Second, because if character involves the 
pursuit of particular values then shared statehood can conduce to their 
satisfaction. 
Much more could be said about the notion of national character, but by 
the middle of the 20th century it had become discredited. Theorists could find 
no greater differences between the characters of members of putatively 
separate nations than between the characters of those within them. Insofar as 
there were differences in national stereotypes, these were subject to sudden 
change and susceptible to political manipulation. However, this reaction did 
not lead to the abandonment of Herderian ideas. While the kind of cultural 
                                                            








homogeneity on which talk of national character was predicated could no 
longer be assured in an era of immigrant minorities and increasingly vocal 
indigenous ones, the idea that members of such groups might differ in deep 
psychological ways has persisted. It has been intellectually revived by 
followers of Herder like Isaiah Berlin and Charles Taylor, and the broader 
notion of cultural identity that has emerged from the wreckage of national 
character has become the common currency of groups in different 
circumstances and with consequentially different concerns and political goals 
– not just the separate statehood of nationalists but other kinds of separate 
treatment. 
 
2. There are two ways to take the idea that cultural identity is a deep going 
feature of individual identity. One of them should be uncontroversial, for no 
one should doubt that the language we speak, the religion we espouse, the 
values we hold dear and so on shape who we are as individuals. An individual 
cultural identity in this sense may well be unique to its possessor, with her 
particular mix of cultural characteristics, just as her character may be. The 
controversial move is to suppose that there are collective cultural identities, 
shared by members of a group, of a correspondingly deep going sort – just as 
it was controversial to move from the idea of an individual’s character to that 
of a shared national character. But it is on the basis of such a supposedly deep 
collective cultural identity that the political claims of groups are commonly 
defended. While there are many ways of elaborating such a defence, a 
common thread is that people are damaged psychologically if their collective 
identity is not recognised in the way demanded by their political claim. My 
self-esteem, my sense of who I am or my capacity for coherent choices are 
severally cited as vulnerable to such misrecognition, and this presupposes the 
depth of the collective identity for which recognition is sought. 
In view of the political importance and philosophical significance of these 
kinds of defence it is, perhaps, not surprising that theorists are not agreed on 
what constitutes collective cultural identity. While some fasten on shared 
values, others fix upon a common language and the shared view of the world 
which it supposedly provides, and yet others emphasise the importance of a 
common narrative into which individuals can fit their particular lives. In the 
case of cultural identity, then, we meet some of the same problems that beset 







the search for an agreed criterion of national identity, and again with the 
conviction that, whatever it was, such a criterion would pick out 
psychologically different kinds of people. But arguably none of the cultural 
characteristics mentioned need go deep with people in order to serve the 
purpose of sorting them out into groups to be organised for political ends. 
Nothing inner needs to be postulated to explain adherence to putatively 
shared values, for example. English people queue for drinks rather than jostle 
for them. This sort of thing is all that is required, just as only lip service to a 
religion is. And similarly, I claim, for other cultural features. What is required 
is something to identify group members by and that need not go deep at all. 
The picture I am rejecting is that of pre-political differences of a 
psychological kind for which various kinds of political recognition are sought. 
The onus of proof is on those who maintain that they exist, since nothing pre-
political needs postulating for us to understand the politics of cultural 
identity. One way to see this is to follow David Miller5 in contrasting the 
Herderian ‘crooked timber of humanity’ picture with an alternative account 
that Berlin also offered, without apparently noticing its divergent 
implications. For Berlin also attributes nationalism to people ‘being confined 
and contracted in their universe; they were like Schiller’s bent twig, which 
always jumped back and hit its bender’.6 On this ‘bent twig’ story, 
expressions of national identity stem, not from pre-existing internal forces, 
but from external and contingent constraints. What I shall argue is that it is 
not only nationalist movements but the politics of cultural identity generally 
that follow the bent twig model. Thus divisions into separate cultural groups 
and the shape of such groups are to be explained by the material and political 
circumstances in which people find themselves. 
There are three aspects to Berlin’s bent twig story to notice. First, a group of 
people are placed in a similar position by the actions of others. Second, their 
reactions are entirely understandable. Third, these reactions are potentially 
dangerous. In Berlin’s own example the rise of German nationalism is 
imputed to the humiliation Germans experienced through being regarded as 
culturally inferior by the French and others. But not all nationalisms or other 
                                                            
5 ‘Crooked timber or bent twig? Berlin’s nationalism’ in G. Crowder and H. Hardy (eds.) 
The One and The Many: Reading Isaiah Berlin ( New York: Prometheus Books, 2007) 








expressions of cultural identity seem to involve such a reaction. Our aim will 
be to distinguish different kinds of political circumstance which possess the 
three features mentioned so that we can classify the different types of 
national and cultural identity that flow from them. I hope to persuade you 
that there is no unitary notion of cultural identity, including national 
identity; that the different types of identity we shall discern as resulting from 
different sorts of circumstance go by the same name – ‘cultural identity’ – 
only because they are appealed to in similar ways politically. In just the same 
manner, I suggest, different kinds of identification count as national identity 
only because it is separate statehood, or something similar, that an appeal to 
them is used to justify. 
 
 
3. If we ask what someone who asserts an identity might be concerned about 
lacking or losing then we should not expect what supplies this lack or loss to 
be the same when the lacks or losses are different. But the way that the 
external circumstances which give rise to the assertion of an identity are 
experienced is as revealing a lack or threatening a loss, for, on the bent twig 
model, without something that is so experienced the twig would, so to speak, 
remain straight, without the potential energy for a political reaction. What 
we are looking for are thus different types of insecurity which people might 
feel in different circumstances, so that those who feel the same sort of 
insecurity come to identify with each other and share a view of themselves 
that helps to counter this insecurity. 
The case of the Germans that Berlin cites can be our first type. What the 
Germans felt that they lacked or might lose is, we may say, their standing. 
They were insecure in their sense of dignity, in view of the lack of respect 
shown them by others. To recover it they adopted a type of cultural identity 
to which values like that of honour were central. Thinking of themselves as 
moved by honour they experienced the self-worth of which the contempt of 
others threatened to deprive them. This is the shape of the twig bent by this 
kind of wind. But not all identities have this shape, and it is wrong of Berlin’s 
follower Charles Taylor, and others, to assume that they do. They are misled, 
perhaps, by thinking that the demand for recognition which cultural groups 
make is always a demand for respect. But political recognition does not 







require respect, only acknowledgement of difference, and, anyway, the 
respect of others whom one does not respect oneself may not be worth having. 
Contrasting with identity as standing is identity as centre, where the 
adoption of certain values as crucial to identity is differently motivated, 
namely by the threat of hollowness, of anomie, of the lack of principles in 
accordance with which one can guide one’s life. This is typically the type of 
identity asserted by indigenous peoples exposed to the value system of 
settlers, so that what needs protecting is a clear action-guiding framework. 
Having no adequate norms is a quite different anxiety from having no norms 
which command respect, so that it would be wrong to conflate the two types 
of identity just because both involve values. Cultural identities, on the 
account I am offering, are not individuated by their content but by the sorts 
of circumstance to which they are a reaction. 
A type of identity that need not involve values at all is what I call 
identity as face. It is a reaction to the fear of facelessness, as we say, of 
becoming an anonymous individual without any distinguishing marks. This is 
an insecurity characteristically experienced when assimilation threatens, and 
the type of identity this evokes involves stressing whatever can be seen as 
marker of difference – a language, perhaps, a mode of dress and so on. Here, 
we may notice, nothing inner or deep is even relevant to the required identity, 
for it has to be something external that plays the identifying role.  
A yet different type of identity is  a reaction to the fear of homelessness, 
of having no place in the world; and identity as home collects people together 
as having a shared relation to a common location, real or imagined, or to a 
common history. Here the kinds of cultural material involved are typically 
different from those in other types of identity though not necessarily so. For a 
people can find a metaphorical home in their literature or music, say, which 
are not in this case to be construed as markers of the cultural difference that 
identity as face requires. 
 
 
4. There are, I believe still other types of identity corresponding to the 
multifariously unsatisfactory situations in which people find themselves, but 
I shall say no more about this now. Instead I want to reiterate that we should 








are what I call surface identities, but not because they all function like 
identity as face, since they lack its constitutive aetiology. Rather there must 
be features in virtue of which members of a cultural group can recognise each 
other, and it does not matter what, if anything, lies behind the lifestyle 
whereby they can do this so long as it is practised consistently and 
spontaneously. I recently saw a photograph of Muslim women demonstrating 
against the French ban on the veil. ‘Shame on France’, read one placard, 
‘Hijab is our identity’. Identity here is a purely surface phenomenon. But the 
French reasons for the ban, that the veil is ‘incompatible with the essential 
values of the French community’, make the quite unjustified assumption that 
one has to look for something behind it and thus betrays the mistaken view 
that all identity is identity as centre. But a shared social practice produces 
only a surface collective identity, however deep going someone’s individual 
reasons for engaging in it may be. 
The surface character of cultural identities yields, I believe, the 
interesting consequence that what we should focus on is the aesthetics of 
identity. A shared identity must be made attractive to its intended bearers so 
that they have a common attachment to the ways in which it is publicly 
expressed and thereby identify with fellow bearers of the identity. Dress and 
behaviour, buildings and landscape, music and literature – all such things can 
be the focus of aesthetic appreciation that is special to members of an identity 
group. A shared aesthetic of this kind can convey a sense of the inwardness of 
the identity as common enthusiasms are evoked. But the sort of collective 
self-identification that people might make on the basis of sharing an aesthetic 
may be mere lip service, and while this may be sufficient for political purposes 
it is insufficient to give such a cultural identity the importance for members 
that is claimed for it in support of these purposes. For self-identification 
produced by aesthetic enthusiasms may reflect no serious common feelings, 
such as a common life in shared circumstances can create. It can be, and often 
is, purely delusory, in the sense that no ethically significant relationships 
between members of the group underlie their avowed identity. 
 
 
5. I turn, then, to looking at the value that is often claimed for cultural 
identity. I do not believe that such an identity, qua membership of a cultural 







group, has the kind of value which is often claimed for it. If it is not a deep 
going feature of people then they have no need for it so far as their 
psychological functioning is concerned. The Herderian notion that there is 
such a need, which is used to justify the political recognition of cultural 
identities and their protection and preservation, falls away. No doubt 
individuals need the languages, values and so on that they have, and this may 
need to be acknowledged in political and legal arrangements, but none of this 
implies membership of a cultural group that furnishes a collective identity, 
failure to recognise which is damaging to them.  
Writers who claim that people need an identity tend to confuse the idea 
that it is valuable for them with the actually quite different idea that it is 
valuable to them, in the sense that they attribute value to it. The latter idea 
often goes with the notion that an identity is needed to confer self-respect, 
and that is why one values having the identity one does. But this is 
mistakenly to take all identities to be identity as standing, the result of 
undervaluation by others. In those circumstances one might take comfort in 
the relevant type of identity, but this is not a universal need. Nor, to take but 
one more example, is ‘the quest for cultural identity...a central human 
concern’, because we need to know ‘where we belong and feel most at home’.7 
Again the identity as home which may provide an answer to such questions is 
a reaction to particular anxieties, not a ‘central human concern’. The value an 
identity might have to people depends upon the circumstances they are in, 
and what answers to their concerns differs from case to case. 
It is, however, the disvalue of cultural identity which should strike us, 
once general arguments for its value are called into question. In particular, it 
seems to me that the Herderian picture underlying the politics of cultural 
identity gives the impression that the compromises necessary for harmonious 
coexistence with others are either difficult or disreputable. For adjustments to 
one’s values or worldview will now seem to require deep-down changes in who 
one is or to demand that one is untrue to oneself. A compromise will be 
perceived as a loss of inner coherence or of integrity. But, though seeing 
another’s point of view or grasping his evaluations may not be easy, it is a 
threat to one’s identity only if one insists on making it so, or if one cannot see 
                                                            
7 As Bhikhu Parekh glosses Samuel Huntington, A New Politics of Identity ( Basingstoke: 








things otherwise, not because of the nature of the case. It is because of a 
willed, or perhaps an unimaginative, inflexibility, not because one’s identity 
somehow restricts one’s options here. But innumerable demands for separate 
political arrangements for different cultural groups would have us think 
otherwise; and in doing so they induce a rigidity in the face of the lifestyles of 
others which, at the worst, can lead to exclusion and even violence. 
A chairman of the British Arts Council once said, ‘One of the basic 
freedoms of the Englishman is freedom from culture’. He said it sarcastically 
and probably meant ‘high culture’, like opera and the like, rather than the 
commonplace cultural characteristics we have been talking about. But even 
about such lowlier cultural characteristics he had a point; for it has always 
been notoriously difficult to fasten on features which mark out an English 
cultural identity, not least because of its uneasy relationship to Britishness, 
which British governments have found equally hard to pin down. All this is, I 
suggest, a happy situation, so long as it lasts. One might hope for a similar 
freedom from culture for as many people as possible. But what I believe to be 
the confused and pernicious notion of cultural identity is now so deeply 
entrenched in politics that this hope is, it seems, a forlorn one. 
 
 
 
 
